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1. Introduction 
 
The current global financial crisis has severely damaged the reputation of 
ratings agencies (RAs) that mispriced credit risk through their ratings assignments. A 
number of banks, which were relatively financially sound according to ratings 
assignments, were forced to close or had to be bailed out by governments. This raises 
the question whether RAs systematically inflate ratings and misprice credit risk. 
Ratings of banks and companies assigned by RAs provide investors with 
information about the financial position of the institution in question and on credit 
risk. Pinto (2006) argues that therefore they facilitate capital allocation. Indeed, the 
importance which is attached to them can be justified on the grounds that they reduce 
asymmetric information between investors and companies. 
However, the ability of RAs to assign ratings correctly has extensively been 
questioned (Altman and Saunders, 1998, Levich et al., 2002, Altman and Rijken, 
2004, Amato and Furfine, 2004, Portes, 2008). One of the most frequent criticisms of 
the prediction abilities of RAs is that they could provide misleading information since 
the analysis is backward- rather than forward-looking. Their low transparency raises 
further concerns about their accuracy. Further, RAs cannot have superior information 
compared with market participants about uncertainty and the degree of insolvency 
(illiquidity) of companies. 
In this paper, we model the bank ratings assigned by Fitch Ratings (FR) with 
the aim of shedding light upon their determinants. Firstly, we consider whether (and 
which of) the key financial variables of banks affect individual ratings. Secondly, we 
examine whether bank ratings are systematically determined by the timing of the 
rating. Thirdly, we incorporate a country index to establish whether country-specific   3
factors affect bank ratings. This methodological innovation, within the context of 
modelling bank ratings, is an additional contribution of our study – we demonstrate 
that it substantially enhances the predictive accuracy of our models. Fourthly, we 
assess our models and the ratings assigned by FR with specific reference to three of 
the first commercial banks (Glitnir, Kaupthing and Northern Rock) affected by the 
2007–2008 crisis.  
Predictions on the financial soundness of banks, corporations and sovereign 
countries are of central importance for analysts, regulators and policy makers. In 
particular, research focusing on the prediction of bank failures by applying Early 
Warning Systems (EWS) has been extensive – see, for example, Mayer and Pifer 
(1970), Altman and Saunders (1998), Kolari et al. (1996) and Kolari et al. (2002). 
Another strand of empirical research focuses on ratings prediction models. There are 
numerous studies that predict bond ratings, such as Kamstra et al. (2001) who 
estimate ordered-logit regressions. Other recent studies (Kim, 2005,  Huang et al., 
2004 and Lee, 2007) show that artificial intelligence methods do not provide superior 
predictions of bond ratings relative to standard ordered choice methods. Hence, using 
ordered logit/probit regressions is a valid way of addressing the main challenge in 
modelling ratings, which is to increase the probability of correct classifications. 
However, we are not aware of any previous studies that seek to model and predict 
individual bank ratings, which is the aim of this paper.  
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
the methods applied, while Section 3 discusses the main empirical findings. Section 4 
considers our models’ predicted ratings for the Glinir, Kaupthing and Northern Rock 
banks, and Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
   4
2. Data and Methodology 
 
FR, as one of the largest rating companies for the banking industry in the 
world, releases four types of ratings: legal ratings, long- and short-term (security) 
ratings and individual ratings. As stated by FR, the rating is closely linked with 
financial performance (financial variables). FR divides banks into five categories 
according to their performance.
4  This study focuses on individual ratings, as our 
objective is to analyse their determinants. Within this context, financial variables of 
commercial banks have been utilised in several ways, for instance as an instrument for 
cross-section and trend analyses of banks. However, the question remains whether or 
not financial variables might be used as indicators of banks’ future financial position 
and, therefore, their individual ratings.  
We use data on 681 international banks’ ratings , denoted  i Y ,
5 between 2000 
and 2007 to estimate models of their determinants. This variable is ordinal and has up 
to nine categories that are assigned integer values from 1 to 9, such that lower values 
indicate a lower rating. The sample size falls as higher-order lagged explanatory 
factors are added to the model and this can cause all banks in a particular category to 
be excluded from the sample. In our application the number of categories is either 8 or 
9 depending upon the lag specification. The nine rating categories (with assigned 
values in brackets) are: E (1), D/E (2), D (3), C/D (4), C (5), B/C (6), B (7), A/B (8), 
                                                 
4 The standard classification of the individual rating is A, B, C, D and E. A further ranking among these 
five ratings is used, that is, A/B, B/C, C/D and D/E. Grade A says that the bank is in an impeccable 
financial position with a consistent record of above average performance. The B rating defines a bank 
as having a sound risk profile without any significant problems. The bank’s performance generally has 
been in line with, or in a better position than, that of its peers. The C rating includes banks which have 
an adequate risk profile but possess one troublesome aspect, giving rise to the possibility of risk 
developing, or which have generally failed to perform in line with their peers. The D rating includes 
banks which are currently under-performing in some notable manner. Their financial conditions are 
likely to be below average and their profitability is poor. These banks have the capability of recovering 
using their own resources, but this is likely to take some time. Finally, the E rating includes banks with 
very serious problems which either require or are likely to require external support. 
5 The BankScope database has been used to obtain a large sample of commercial banks rated by FR.   5
A (9). Figure 1 shows the percentage of banks that are awarded a particular rating 
each year. The five highest categories (A, A/B, B, B/C and C) have larger percentages 
in the first three years (2000, 2001 and 2002) compared to the latter years. In contrast, 
the four lowest categories (C/D, D, D/E and E) have broadly smaller percentages in 
the first three years compared to the latter years. This suggests that average bank 
ratings have declined over time – we assess this possibility in our modelling.
6 
We apply ordered choice estimation techniques to model this ordinal 
dependent variable because, as is well known, they are the appropriate method to use 
in this case. The ordered dependent variable model assumes the following latent 
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6 Indeed, the average numerical ratings (where E = 1 and A = 9) are 5.00 in 2000, 5.41 in 2001, 5.83 in 
2002, 5.10 in 2003, 5.11 in 2004, 4.31 in 2005, 4.70 in 2006 and 4.64 in 2007. Hence, ratings in the last 
three years are notably lower than in the first three years, confirming the impression of a general 
decline in ratings. This would suggest that a time trend could enter the logit/probit ratings regressions 
with a negative coefficient. 
7 The model has both cross-sectional and time-series elements; however, the latter refers to the year a 
rating was made rather than the calendar year. Further, there is only one time-series observation for 
each bank’s dependent variable, although lags are available on the explanatory factors. Therefore, the 
model is not a pooled data specification. Rather, it is a cross-sectional model with time-series dynamics 
in the explanatory variables.    6
 
where  1 λ ,  2 λ ,…,  8 λ  are unknown parameters (limit points) to be estimated with the 
coefficients (the  kl β s). We are primarily interested in the general direction of 
correlation between the dependent and independent variables. Therefore, we use the 
sign of  kl β  to provide guidance on whether the estimated signs of the coefficients are 
consistent with our a priori expectations. This is instead of looking at the marginal 
effects which indicate the direction of change of the dependent variable (for each 
value of the dependent variable) in response to a change in  l t ik X − , . For ordered choice 
models these marginal effects are difficult to interpret.  
  The probit form of this model assumes that the cumulative distribution 
function employed is based upon the standard normal random variable, while the logit 
form assumes a logistic distribution. Greene (2008) suggests that probit and logit 
models yield results that are very similar in practice.  
  The first variable that we include in our model is for the year in which the 
rating was made [ it time ]. We do not include lagged values of  it time ; however, we do 
consider the lagged values of the following seven factors as further potential 
determinants of bank ratings: the ratio of equity to total assets [denoted  it Equity ], the 
ratio of liquid assets to total assets [ it Liquidity ] the natural logarithm of total assets 
[ () it Assets ln ] and the net interest margin [NI_Margin],  it it it OEA OIA NOA − =  (where 
it OIA   is the ratio of operating income to total assets and  it OEA   is the ratio of 
operating expenses to assets), the ratio of operating expenses to total operating income 
[ it OEOI ] and the return on equity [ it ROAE ].
8 
                                                 
8 The following three further variables were also considered for inclusion in the model: the ratio of 
operating expenses to assets [OEA], the ratio of operating income to assets [OIA] and the return on   7
  We do not include current values of these seven variables because they 
may contain information that was unknown at the time the rating was made. For 
example, if a bank’s rating was decided in January 2007 then the value of any 
explanatory factor measured over the whole of 2007 would be unknown when the 
rating was made. It is worth noting that as more lags are included in the model the 
sample size falls because there is information on all variables for fewer banks. Models 
could not be estimated when the lag length exceeded four. Therefore, models are 
estimated from one up to four lags of these variables. 
  Although rating agencies always endeavour to incorporate the most recent 
information into their ratings, they may also form their views on the basis of the 
history of a bank’s performance. This justifies considering variables lagged more than 
one period in our model. Indeed, the relative importance of recent and older data in 
rating decisions will be indicated by the order of the lags that are found to be 
significant.  
  Finally, we incorporate a country index to capture country-specific 
variations in ratings. Because there are 90 countries an ordered choice model 
incorporating 89 country dummy variables would need to be estimated; however, such 
a model could not be estimated. Therefore, we proceeded to construct a single country 
index reflecting cross-country differences, which is a cross-sectional variant of the 
method discussed in Hendry (2001). This index will capture variations in bank ratings 
                                                                                                                                            
assets [ ROAA]. These were excluded from the model because they would cause a high degree of 
multicollinearity and their effects could be captured in other ways. That is, the effects of OEA and 
OIA   are captured by the variable  OEA OIA NOA − =  while  ROAA  is a close substitute of ROAE  
(which it is highly correlated with). The highest pairwise simple correlations amongst the explanatory 
factors involve these variables. Specifically, the simple correlation coefficients for the each pairing 
(calculated using a common sample) are the following: OEA and OIA, 0.98; ROAA and  NOA, 0.89; 
OIA  and  NOA , 0.84; OEA  and  NOA , 0.72; OIA  and  ROAA , 0.71; ROAA  and  ROAE , 0.62; 
ROAA and OEA, 0.60. The simple correlation coefficients of pairs of variables retained in the model 
are all well below 0.5 (most are substantially lower than this), which helps to ensure that the reported 
regressions do not suffer from severe multicollinearity.     8
that are unaccounted for by the explanatory factors. As Hendry (2001) suggests, this 
should reduce chance correlations between ratings and explanatory variables and not 
remove the effects of explanatory variables that genuinely influence ratings.
9 Since 
individual country dummy variables have clusters of zeros that can distort test 
statistics the combination of these dummies into a single country index should 
minimise these effects.
10  Including an index should also improve efficiency of 
estimation relative to using a number of dummy variables. Indeed, in the current 
application it was not possible to estimate a model with even half of the ninety 
countries’ individual dummy variables and, therefore, constructing an index makes 
capturing all individual country effects possible. The introduction of this country 
index within the context of modelling bank ratings is a novel feature of this paper. 
  The country index was constructed as follows.  
(1) Five regressions, each including 18 of the 90 country dummy variables, were used 
to determine initially the coefficient of each individual country’s dummy variable 
and its significance.  
(2) Country dummies with very similar coefficients (which we defined as the 
difference in the coefficients being less than half of the standard error of the 
dummy with the smallest standard error) were combined and the restriction 
involved tested using a likelihood ratio (LR) test. Only dummies with t-ratios 
exceeding 1.5 were considered for being entered as combined dummies. 
                                                 
9 Hendry’s analysis is within the context of modelling inflation using time-series data.  
10 Hendry and Santos (2005) discuss the effects of using sets of impulse dummy variables within the 
context of a static OLS regression and find the following. The coefficients of the individual dummies 
can be consistently estimated; however, the t-ratio of such a dummy is inconsistent. When many 
impulse dummies are included this does not cause bias in the coefficients of the non-dummy variables 
in the model or adversely affect their significance. Hence, the use of many dummies in a general-to-
specific framework is appropriate as the presence of impulse dummies need not affect model selection. 
However, tests of the normality of an OLS regression’s residuals will have low power when the model 
incorporates many impulse dummies. Further, impulse dummies can cause substantial size distortion in 
White’s test for heteroscedasticity in the residuals of an OLS regression because of many residuals 
being set equal to zero. Using an index of indicators is shown to make these problems less severe.     9
(3) Using these combined dummies we were able to represent all of the countries in 
two separate regressions – countries that did not feature in any combined variable 
were entered as individual country dummies. Note that each country featured in 
only one of the two regressions.  We then proceeded to further combine dummies 
whose coefficients differed by no more than one standard error and used LR tests 
to validate, or otherwise, such restrictions. 
(4) Eventually, the process of combining the countries into groups of composite 
dummy variables reduced the number of these dummies sufficiently so that all 
countries could be represented in a single regression. From this regression a single 
index of country dummy variables was constructed using the coefficients on the 
composite dummy variables as weights – once again any countries that could not 
be entered in a composite variable were entered separately. 
(5) This index was checked for appropriateness by running a single regression that 
included the country index plus each individual country’s dummy at a time. If the 
latter was significant the value of this dummy’s coefficient was incorporated into 
the country index. This was repeated for all ninety countries, that is, ninety 
distinct regressions that contained only two variables (the country index and a 
particular country’s dummy) were estimated. After all the coefficients of the 
individual country dummies that were significant in these ninety regressions had 
been incorporated into the index this step was repeated until no individual country 
dummies were significant at the 5% level (when included in a regression with the 
country index). The resulting country index (denoted  it Country )  is specified by 
equation (3).
11  
                                                 
11  This country index does not include all countries’ dummies because insignificant terms were 
excluded. 78 countries are represented in the country index and 12 are excluded. The excluded 
countries are: Bermuda, Brazil, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Poland,   10
Models were then constructed using this country index and the other 
explanatory factors (financial variables and time term). A cross-sectional variant of 
the general-to-specific method was employed to produce an initial favoured model.
12 
Omitted variable tests were then conducted by testing each excluded variable’s 
individual significance (at the 5% level) using both z and LR statistics. Any 
significant variable was considered for inclusion: it was included if the new model 
exhibited a lower SBC. This should ensure that the specification of the model is 
relatively robust to the model selection procedure.  
Four sets of models were considered. The first allows a maximum of four lags, 
the second features a maximum of three lags, the third a maximum of two lags and the 
fourth has only one lag of the financial variables. The sample size ranges from 359 
observations for the model incorporating four lags to 629 observations for the single 
lag model. There is a trade-off between accuracy of estimation and the generality of 
lags considered in the model. This makes it difficult to determine which lag 
lenghtprovides superior inference. We therefore seek results that are consistent across 
lag specifications to draw inferences. 
(3) 
                                                                                                                                            
Slovakia and Thailand. These countries, with an implied zero coefficient, are ranked between the group 
San Marino and South Africa and the group Colombia, Costa Rica, Morocco and Peru.   
12 In this method we first delete all variables with z-statistics below one (or, exceptionally, 0.5 if the z-
statistics are very small for a large number of variables) and apply a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test relative 
to the general model. If the restrictions cannot be rejected, we delete all variables with z-statistics 
below 1.5 and then all explanatory factors with z-statistics below 1.96 (applying all LR tests relative to 
the general model). If any LR test for joint restrictions is rejected, we experiment to find the variable(s) 
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3. Empirical Results 
 
The ordered logit and probit regression results for the determinants of bank 
ratings with four lags of the explanatory variables are presented in Table 1. The logit 
(probit) results for the three-lag, two-lag and one-lag specifications are all reported in 
Table 2 (Table 3).
13  For all four-lag specifications we report a general model 
(including all lags of the variables) and one parsimonious specification obtained using 
the general-to-specific methodology (followed by omitted variables testing). When 
                                                 
13 For the four-lag and three-lag specifications the omission of data means that one category of the 
dependent variable (the category corresponding to an A rating,  9 = i Y ) is omitted from the regressions. 
For the other lag specifications all categories of the dependent variable are included.    12
more than one model could be chosen the favoured parsimonious model was selected 
as that which minimises Schwartz’s Information Criterion (SIC). 
In all cases the favoured parsimonious model only includes individually 
(according to z-statistics) and jointly (according to a likelihood ratio test, denoted LR 
statistic) significant variables. In all cases the restrictions placed on the general model 
to obtain the parsimonious model cannot be rejected according to a likelihood ratio 
test [LR(general→*)]. Whilst these generally are exclusion restrictions we also 
consider combining  2 − it Liquidity  and  3 − it Liquidity   into the difference variable, 
3 2 2 − − − − = Δ it it it Liquidity Liquidity Liquidity ,  given that they have approximately equal 
and opposite signs in the specifications with three and four lags. Upon this basis the 
model favoured in the three- and four- lag specifications include  2 − Δ it Liquidity  for 
both probit and logit forms.
14  The favoured parsimonious models will yield more 
efficient inference relative to the general model and are, therefore, used for inference. 
The same models are favoured in the probit and logit forms for each lag specification.  
Considering the favoured parsimonious model for all four lag specifications 
we find that they include the following statistically significant effects with an 
unambiguous direction of correlation: the variable time has an unambiguous negative 
effect on bank ratings - the more recently the bank’s rating, the lower the rating, 
ceteris paribus; Equity (capital adequacy) has a positive effect on a bank’s rating: a 
more capitalised bank has a higher rating.
15; the natural log of assets also has a 
positive effect on bank ratings: banks with a larger size of assets have a higher 
                                                 
14 Unreported potential alternative parsimonious models results are available from the authors upon 
request.  
15 For  Equity  only the first lag is significant in the one and two lag specifications, only the third lag is 
significant in the three and four lag specifications. The coefficient is always positive.     13
rating;
16 OEOI  has a negative correlation with a bank’s rating;
17 the return on assets 
has a significant and positive impact upon ratings.
18   All of these effects are 
unambiguous and consistent with prior beliefs.  
Country   has a positive coefficient indicating that country-specific effects 
affect bank ratings: a bank in a less stable/developed/rich economy appears to have a 
lower rating. For example, Canada, Norway and Sweden are in the group of countries 
with the highest country-specific rating while Bangladesh has the lowest country-
specific rating. This finding confirms our hypothesis that a bank’s country of origin 
plays an important role in assigning individual ratings, and that there are country-
specific effects that are not explained by the financial variables (rather like fixed-
effects in a panel data model). Interestingly, Ireland (Andorra) is ranked in a relatively 
low (high) position in the country index.  
Liquidity is only significant in models that allow at least three lags. Notably, 
both the second and third lag of this variable are significant and their coefficients are 
of approximately equal and opposite sign – this is the case in both the three- and four- 
lag specifications. Hence, it is the second lag of the change in liquidity,  2 − Δ t Liquidity , 
rather than its level, that appears to be important and has a plausible positive effect 
upon bank ratings. That is, a bank whose liquidity increased two periods ago has a 
higher rating. It seems that the time lag of this effect is important because liquidity 
was not significant in models allowing less than three lags. We note that this effect 
would not have been revealed had we not allowed for sufficient lags in the dynamic 
                                                 
16 Only the first lag of  () Assets ln  is significant in the favoured parsimonious model for all four-lag 
specifications.  
17 The only OEOI  terms that are insignificant are the third and fourth lags of this variable in the four- 
lag specification. All significant terms of this variable have a negative sign.  
18 The first lag of ROAE  is significant regardless of the lag specification. The third lag of ROAE  is 
also significant in the three-lag specification while its fourth lag is significant in the four-lag 
specification. The coefficient on this variable is always positive.   14
specification. We believe that allowing for such lags is a strength of our investigation 
relative to analyses that do not consider such dynamics. Indeed, we are not aware of 
any previous studies of ratings that have considered any dynamics in their models.  
The variable  NI_Margin  is significant in only the two-lag specification and, 
in this case, it is the second lag that is significant. If it is the timing of the lag that is 
important one would not expect NI_Margin to be significant in the one-lag 
specification because it does not allow for a second lag. However, its second lag 
would be expected to be significant in the three- and four-lag specifications too, but it 
is not. This may be because it is dominated by the  2 − Δ t Liquidity  variable in these 
specifications. Thus, it appears that the effect of NI_Margin  on bank ratings is fragile, 
although, to the extent that there is an effect, it is a plausible positive relation. 
Finally, NOA is significant in only the four-lag specification with the second 
lag being the significant term. We are cautious in interpreting this as supportive of a 
significant effect upon rating because  2 − t NOA  is not significant in the two- and three- 
lag specifications. Further, in the model where it is significant it has a theoretically 
implausible negative sign. For these two reasons we are inclined to view this apparent 
correlation as most likely being a Type-I error (of which there is a 5% chance given 
our chosen significance level).  
We also assess the percentage of correct predictions of the favoured 
parsimonious models for each lag specification in Table 4.
19 A prediction is correct 
when a particular observed rating is correctly assigned by the model.  From Table 4 
(top section) we can see that there are between 50.56% and 54.46% (50.83% and 
53.42%) correct predictions for the favoured logit (probit) models including the 
                                                 
19 This prediction is calculated using the same sample employed to estimate the data. It is a fit measure 
rather than providing an assessment of out-of-sample performance. We did not drop any observations 
for the purpose of out-of-sample evaluation in order to maximise the period that could be used for 
estimation and, therefore, maximise its efficiency.    15
country variable.
20 The percentage of correct predictions for two versions of these 
models excluding the country variable are also reported in Table 4 for comparison 
purposes. The first version includes exactly the same variables as the favoured 
parsimonious models (reported in Tables 1 – 4) except the Country variable, which is 
removed (to save space we do not report these estimates; however, these results are 
available from the authors on request). The percentage of correct predictions for these 
models are given in the middle section of Table 4: they are in the range 28.46% – 
32.94% for the logit specification and 27.51% – 33.41% for the probit form. The 
second version applies the general-to-specific method with all variables except for 
Country which is included in the general model (again these results are available on 
request). The percentage of correct predictions associated with these regressions are 
reported in the bottom section of Table 4: these are between 30.84% and 36.57% for 
the logit form and 29.41% and 34.07% for the probit specification. They are 
substantially greater (by approximately 20 percentage points) for the models that 
incorporate the Country variable compared with those that do not. The regressions 
including this country index also have much larger pseudo 
2 R s and the country index 
is highly significant in all parsimonious models. This further demonstrates the 
importance of modelling country effects for predicting international bank ratings. It 
also indicates that ordered choice models of international bank ratings that exclude 
such effects will omit important information for predicting ratings. 
From Table 4 we also note that our models have difficulty in correctly 
predicting the extreme A and E ratings. We believe that this is likely to be due to the 
relatively small numbers of banks that appear in these categories.  
 
                                                 
20 These percentage of correct predictions are extremely similar for probit and logit specifications with 
neither form of the model performing better across all lag specifications.   16
4. Predicted ratings for Glitnir, Kaupthing and Northern Rock 
 
In this section we use our estimated models of international bank ratings to 
provide predictions for three high profile bank casualties of the international banking 
crisis of 2007–2008: Glitnir (Iceland), Kaupthing (Iceland) and Northern Rock (UK). 
We also consider some implications of the predicted ratings for these three banks. 
 
Northern Rock and its rating 
  
  Given the difficulty that Northern Rock faced in autumn of 2007 we 
compare our favoured models’ predictions of Northern Rock’s rating with that made 
by FR.
21   Predictions for Northern Rock’s rating are only available from the 
specifications with up to one and two lags because of data constraints. Our favoured 
model for the one (two) lag specification predicts a rating of B/C (B) which compares 
with FR’s actual rating for Northern Rock of C/D. This was made on 17 September 
2007 and represents a downgrading from the previous FR rating of A/B. Thus, whilst 
Northern Rock’s financial variables (via our models) suggested a downgrading from 
A/B to either B or B/C in this period, it is clear that FR utilised information 
extraneous to our model (and beyond what financial variables would suggest) to 
downgrade the rating even further (to C/D). This may imply that FR did, to some 
extent, recognise the change in risk of Northern Rock and that it used information that 
is not fully captured by ordered choice models. Alternatively, FR may have 
overreacted when exposed to enormous pressure. The country index that we used 
shows that the UK’s banking system was ranked 14
th out of the 90 countries under 
                                                 
21 Llewellyn (2008) provides a detailed analysis of what went wrong with Northern Rock.   17
consideration.
22 This reinforces the view that a UK bank, such as Northern Rock, 
would not have been expected to be most at risk or the first casualty of the 
international banking crisis. It also helps explain why our model predicts a higher 
rating than that given by FR since a country’s standing in the index constructed above 
has not been altered (to reflect the impact of the crisis) in making the prediction.  
 
Glitnir and Kaupthing and their ratings 
 
Because of a substantial deterioration in the bank’s funding position the Icelandic 
government was forced to buy a 75% stake in the country’s third largest bank, Glitnir, 
on 29 September 2008. This was followed on October 9 by the nationalisation of 
Iceland’s largest bank, Kaupthing. FR downgraded both banks ratings from B/C 
(made in 2005) to E (Glitnir) and C (Kaupthing) on 30 September 2008. Our models’ 
in-sample predicted ratings for both of these banks (based only on the specification 
with one lag owing to data constraints) are identical to their pre-crisis rating of B/C. 
This suggests that FR did not employ any information extraneous to our model (and 
beyond what financial variables would suggest) in making the rating prior to the 
emergence of the crisis. The country index that we used in our models shows that the 
Icelandic banking system was ranked 10
th out of the 90 countries that we consider. 
Hence, prior to the emergence of the crisis Icelandic banks were not considered to be 
particularly at risk, although Iceland’s country rating was downgraded after the 
banking crisis emerged (at a similar time to the downgrading of its bank rating).  
  As for Northern Rock, FR responded to the problems with Glitnir bank by  
downgrading the Icelandic banks ratings: they did not predict the decline of the bank. 
                                                 
22 The country index of indicators has been constructed to provide a broad measure of the general 
ranking of a country’s overall banking system.    18
Indeed, the liquidity position of these banks and their general performance had been 




Using data on 681 banks from around the world we examine whether 
international bank ratings are determined by financial variables, the timing of when 
the rating was conducted by Fitch Ratings and a bank’s country of origin. We reach 
the following clear conclusions. Banks with a greater capitalisation (Equity ), larger 
assets [ () Assets ln ], and a higher return on assets (ROAE) have higher bank ratings. 
Further, the greater a bank’s ratio of operating expenses to total operating income 
(OEOI ), the lower a bank’s rating. We also find a convincing positive effect for the 
second lag of the change in liquidity ( ) Liquidity Δ : if liquidity increased two periods 
ago bank ratings will rise. This finding shows that FR’s ratings reflect, at least to 
some extent, a bank’s liquidity position. However, there is only weak and 
unconvincing evidence that the net interest margin (NI_Margin) and net operating 
income to total assets () NOA  are significant determinants of a bank’s rating. Overall, 
we conclude that these are probably not important determinants of bank ratings. 
Nevertheless, overall ratings appear to reflect a bank’s financial position (as measured 
by various financial variables).  
In addition, the date of the bank’s rating (time) has a robust effect on ratings: 
the more recent is the date when the rating is made, the lower is the rating of the bank. 
This result supports our working hypothesis that FR and other RAs have applied more 
prudent views and policies as a reaction to critiques of their role during the financial 
turbulence of the late 1990s.    19
There is strong evidence of country effects on bank ratings such that banks in 
some countries have systematically higher ratings than others. Inclusion of this 
country effect substantially raises the ability of an ordered choice model to predict 
accurately international bank ratings relative to models that exclude country effects. 
This suggests that international studies attempting to predict ratings, and not just 
identifying determinants, have to include country effects in their models. The 
inclusion of country-specific effects in our analysis represents a major contribution to 
the current research on predicting international ratings in general. 
  Since the predictions of UK and Icelandic bank ratings assigned by FR and our 
model are consistent, we conclude that our model made reasonable predictions of 
bank ratings for the pre-crisis period based upon publicly available information. 
However, our case studies of these banks raise doubts about the ability of both our 
model and RAs to predict ratings as the international banking crisis emerged. 
The estimated results unambiguously support the hypothesis that individual 
ratings assigned by FR are underpinned by fundamental quantitative financial 
analyses. Of course, we recognise that the views of experts, and a certain degree of 
qualitative information, seem to be an integral part of the process followed to 
determine ratings. However, because this information is not publically available it 
cannot be formally included in our models. Hence, such models are not likely to be 
able to predict ratings with 100% accuracy and are likely to be highly inaccurate 
during periods of financial instability. Nevertheless, the assignments provided by RAs 
during stable periods do appear to be informative.  
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Table 1: Bank ratings ordered logit and probit regressions (4 lags)  
 
  Logit specifications  Probit specifications 
Variables General  model  Parsimonious model  General model  Parsimonious model 
Country   2.123 (12.580) 2.067  (14.269)  1.154 (12.65) 1.125 (13.52) 
time   –0.298 (–2.112) –0.246  (–2.129)  –0.182 (–2.50) –0.155 (–2.42) 
1 − t Equity   –0.002 (–0.044)      0.004  (0.17)     
1 − t Liquidity   0.272 (0.180)      0.328 (0.40)     
() 1 ln − t Assets   0.815 (2.579) 0.529  (6.932)  0.499 (2.81) 0.293 (7.11) 
NI_Margin 1 − t   –0.015 (–0.101)      –0.020 (–0.32)     
1 − t NOA   7.052 (0.725)      2.109 (0.41)     
1 − t OEOI   –0.515 (–2.028) –0.504  (–3.437)  –0.288 (–1.93) –0.300 (–3.73) 
1 − t ROAE   0.021 (1.470) 0.033  (3.565)  0.015 (2.00) 0.019 (3.81) 
2 − t Equity   0.034 (0.645)      0.013 (0.46)     
2 − t Liquidity   5.601 (2.903)      3.111 (2.90)     
() 2 ln − t Assets   0.064 (0.090)      –0.133  (–0.34)     
NI_Margin 2 − t   0.103 (0.689)      0.061 (0.83)     
2 − t NOA   –30.396   (–1.677)  –11.333  (–2.570)  –15.979   (–1.61)  –6.303  (–2.22) 
2 − t OEOI   –1.416 (–2.164) –1.824  (–3.222)  –0.773 (–2.09) –1.007 (–3.17) 
2 − t ROAE   0.017 (1.635)      0.007 (1.25)     
3 − t Equity   0.071 (0.984) 0.086  (6.730)  0.049 (1.47) 0.051 (6.84) 
3 − t Liquidity   –5.384 (–2.545)      –2.873 (–2.64)     
() 3 ln − t Assets   –0.588 (–0.621)      –0.218 (–0.46)     
NI_Margin 3 − t   –0.078 (–1.007)      –0.041 (–0.97)     
3 − t NOA   5.409 (0.556)      3.486 (0.67)     
3 − t OEOI   –0.329 (–0.651)      –0.266 (–0.83)     
3 − t ROAE   0.000 (0.002)      –0.000  (–0.12)     
4 − t Equity   –0.005 (–0.114)      –0.007 (–0.33)     
4 − t Liquidity   –0.342 (–0.237)      –0.447 (–0.62)     
() 4 ln − t Assets   0.288 (0.522)      0.169 (0.61)     
NI_Margin 4 − t   0.029 (0.923)      0.020 (1.09)     
4 − t NOA   –0.818 (–0.224)      –0.944 (–0.48)     
4 − t OEOI   –0.016 (–0.126)      –0.028 (–0.34)     
4 − t ROAE   0.003 (1.011) 0.004  (2.849)  0.002 (1.00) 0.002 (2.27) 
2 − Δ t Liquidity      5.751  (4.537)      3.227  (4.41) 
Limit Points            
λ1  –0.478  (–0.317)  –1.217 (–0.952) –0.165 (–0.211) –0.497 (–0.734) 
λ2  3.211  (2.113)  2.436 (1.863) 1.672 (2.107) 1.333 (1.962) 
λ3  5.738  (3.702)  4.928 (3.702) 3.043 (3.764) 2.686 (3.889) 
λ4  7.660  (4.836)  6.840 (5.004) 4.073 (4.937) 3.710 (5.256) 
λ5  9.954  (6.114)  9.118 (6.480) 5.341 (6.288) 4.967 (6.814) 
λ6  11.624 (7.063) 10.772  (7.584) 6.252 (7.249) 5.869 (7.926) 
λ7  14.161 (8.270) 13.259  (8.928) 7.637 (8.607) 7.227 (9.452) 
Fit Measures            
Pseudo 
2 R    0.383 0.380  0.370  0.367 
SBC 3.001  2.686  2.935  2.621 
LR  statistic  533.432  [0.000]  530.320 [0.000] 515.964 [0.000] 512.525 [0.000] 
LR(general→*)  NA 5.986  [0.999]  NA  6.239  [0.999] 
Observations 359  360  359  360 
Table 1 notes. The dependent variable is a bank’s rating which takes a maximum of nine categories that correspond to the integer 
values in the range of 1 to 9 and yields up to eight limit points,  8   ,..., 2   , 1    , = i i λ  (the intercept is not separately identified from the 
limit points). Z-statistics (in parentheses) are based upon Huber-White standard errors. Also reported are the Pseudo 
2 R , 
Schwartz’s information criterion, SBC, and likelihood ratio tests for the model’s explanatory power, LR Statistic, and the 
deletion of variables from the general model to obtain the parsimonious model, LR(general→*). Probability values are given in 
square parentheses. All regressions were estimated using E-Views 6.0 and STATA 10.   22
Table 2: Bank ratings ordered logit regressions (1 – 3 lags)  
 
Variables General  Parsimonious  General Parsimonious  General Parsimonious 































































































    




    




    







2 − t NOA   –6.033  
(–0.78) 


















    




     
3 − t Liquidity   –3.997 
(–2.89) 
       
() 3 ln − t Assets   –0.045 
(–0.11) 
       
NI_Margin 3 − t   0.012 
(0.25) 
       
3 − t NOA   –3.615 
(–0.67) 
       




     




     
2 − Δ t Liquidity    3.938 
(2.975) 
     
Limit Points            
λ1  –0.353  –1.207  –1.197 –0.823  –0.104 –0.193 
λ2  3.422  2.420  2.311 2.692  3.610 3.302 
λ3  6.023  4.977  4.871 5.244  6.057 5.747 
λ4  7.858  6.818  6.652 7.020  7.810 7.504 
λ5  10.098  9.040  8.685 9.042  9.917 9.613 
λ6  11.865  10.761  10.402 10.746  11.731 11.421 
λ7  14.299  13.145  12.870 13.203  14.128 13.809 
λ8      15.615 15.953  16.484 16.159 
Fit Measures            
Pseudo 
2 R    0.387  0.381  0.370 0.369  0.361 0.361 
SBC  2.821  2.659  2.779 2.691  2.705 2.676 


















Observations  425  425  538 538  629 629 
Table 2 notes: see notes to Table 1.  
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Table 3: Bank ratings ordered probit regressions (1 – 3 lags)  
 
Variables General  Parsimonious  General Parsimonious  General  Parsimonious 































































































   




   




   







2 − t NOA   –3.484  
(–0.788) 


















   




      
3 − t Liquidity   –2.208 
(–2.992) 
      
() 3 ln − t Assets   0.051 
(0.211) 
      
NI_Margin 3 − t   0.011 
(0.416) 
      
3 − t NOA   –1.266 
(–0.428) 
      




      




      
2 − Δ t Liquidity    2.188 
(3.084) 
      
Limit Points            
λ1  0.064 –0.343  –0.220  –0.082 0.356  0.174 
λ2  1.956 1.486 1.457  1.609 1.971 1.782 
λ3  3.322 2.834 2.788  2.932 3.223 3.035 
λ4  4.288 3.802 3.726  3.864 4.127 3.942 
λ5  5.500 5.007 4.810  4.944 5.246 5.061 
λ6  6.438 5.929 5.715  5.843 6.214 6.027 
λ7  7.771 7.241 7.090  7.211 7.541 7.349 
λ8     8.493  8.612  8.728  8.530 
Fit Measures            
Pseudo 
2 R    0.368 0.363 0.349  0.347 0.338 0.337 
SBC 2.893  2.729  2.861  2.775  2.800  2.771 


















Observations 425 425 538  538 629 629 
Table 3 notes: see notes to Table 1.    24
Table 4: Percentage of correct predictions of favoured logit and probit models 
 
  Percentage of correct predictions 
    
  Favoured Logit   Favoured Probit 
Rating  4 lags  3 lags  2 lags  1 lag  4 lags  3 lags  2 lags  1 lag 
E  33.33 27.27 25.00 23.08 44.44 27.27 25.00 38.46
D/E  60.00 57.14 57.14 56.52 60.00 60.71 60.32 55.07
D  60.87 64.29 69.70 61.91 60.87 61.91 65.66 62.86
C/D  36.07 31.34 36.25 30.68 34.43 26.87 23.75 22.73
C  68.92 74.39 67.37 71.43 74.32 78.05 73.68 77.31
B/C  28.89 33.33 33.78 41.00 17.78 25.93 24.32 40.00
B  46.34 47.06 71.43 67.68 48.78 54.90 79.76 72.73
A/B  31.25  25.00  25.00 19.36 37.50 25.00 7.14 9.68
A  NA NA  0.00 0.00 NA NA  0.00  0.00
Total  50.56 51.29 54.46 52.94 50.83 51.29 52.42 53.42
    
  Logit excluding country 1  Probit excluding country 1 
Rating  4 lags  3 lags  2 lags  1 lag  4 lags  3 lags  2 lags  1 lag 
E  11.11 9.09 8.33 7.69 11.11 9.09 8.33 7.69
D/E  35.56 39.29 38.10 30.44 35.56 37.50 30.16 28.99
D  44.93 52.38 58.59 51.43 47.83 54.76 59.60 51.43
C/D  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
C  72.97 65.85 44.21 54.62 74.32 65.85 35.79 52.94
B/C  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
B  36.59 35.29 39.29 37.37 19.51 35.29 39.29 38.38
A/B  6.25 5.00 7.14 3.23 25.00 10.00 7.14 3.23
A  NA NA  0.00 0.00 NA NA  0.00  0.00
Total  32.78 32.94 29.74 28.46 32.50 33.41 27.51 28.14
    
  Logit excluding country 2  Probit excluding country 2 
Rating  4 lags  3 lags  2 lags  1 lag  4 lags  3 lags  2 lags  1 lag 
E  11.11 9.09 8.33 7.69 11.11 9.09 8.33 7.69
D/E  22.22 35.09 30.16 27.54 24.44 33.33 30.16 23.19
D  52.17 53.57 55.56 49.52 53.62 52.38 54.55 47.62
C/D  20.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
C  70.27 70.73 57.90 58.82 75.68 71.95 54.74 60.50
B/C  0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
B  41.46 37.26 53.57 45.46 36.59 31.37 55.95 45.46
A/B  18.75 5.00 3.57 3.23 18.75 15.00 3.57 3.23
A  NA NA  0.00 0.00 NA NA  0.00  0.00
Total  36.57 33.80 32.71 30.84 34.07 33.33 32.34 29.41
The favoured logit (probit) models are those reported in Tables 1 and 2 (Tables 1 and 3) whereas the 
models with the country variable removed are called logit/probit excluding country 1. Models 
developed using the general-to-specific method where the country variable is excluded from the 
general model are called logit/probit excluding country 2. The percentage of correct predictions are the 
percentage of times that a particular observed rating (say A) is correctly predicted by the model.  
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